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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

Respondent filed her Cross-Appeal after Plaintiff
appealed the Order on Order to Show Cause issued by the First
District Court of Box Elder County.

Respondent is entitled to

cross-appeal pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Defendant filed an Order to Show Cause requesting the
Court to modify the Decree of Divorce entered in the aboveentitled action awarding Defendant custody of the minor
children of the parties.

Plaintiff objected on the basis of

lack of jurisdiction of the District Court for Box Elder
County and requested the Court to transfer all matters related
to custody and visitation to the State of Washington, where
the children of the parties were residing.

The Trial Court

denied all motions of Plaintiff to transfer jurisdiction and
proceeded with the Hearing on Defendant's Order to Show Cause,
subsequently modifying the Divorce Decree allowing joint
custody, with Plaintiff maintaining primary physical custody
of the children.

Defendant appealed the Order of the Court

which was subsequently dismissed for lack of prosecution by
Defendant.

Plaintiff cross-appealed on the basis of
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jurisdiction and is requesting the Court of Appeals to rule on
the issue of jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Respondent presents one issue to be determined by the
Court of Appeals, to-wit:

Does the First District Court in

and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, have jurisdiction
pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,
UCA 78-45c-I, et. seq., in order to hear Defendant's request
to modify the Decree of Divorce entered in the Action.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, OR REGULATIONS

The issue raised by Respondent in this Appeal is
determined soley by the Utah Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, SUPRA, and specifically UCA 78-45c-3 and UCA
78-45c-7.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Nature of the Case.
The Action appealed herein is the Trial Court's Order on
Order to Show Cause dealing with the Defendant's request to
modify the Decree of Divorce entered in the Action granting
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Defendant custody of the minor children of the parties.

2.

Course of Proceedings.

Defendant/ Appellant, Mark Weiner, on or about October
28, 1985, filed and served on Plaintiff/Respondent an Order to
Show Cause requesting, among other things, that the Decree of
Divorce entered in this action be modified to award custody of
the minor children of the parties to Defendant.

Plaintiff,

by and through counsel, filed a Motion for Change of
Jurisdiction on or about November 15, 1985.

Plaintiff was

served with the Order to Show Cause on or about December 5,
1985.
Plaintiff's Motion for Change of Jurisdiction was denied,
whereafter Plaintiff filed a Motion to Partially Set Aside the
Memorandum Decision regarding the Court's decision on
jurisdiction, which was also denied.

Thereafter,

Plaintiff

filed a Petition to Appeal an Interlocutory Order in the
Supreme Court of Utah, Case No. 860116, which Petition was
also denied.
The hearing on Defendant's Order to Show Cause was held
in the District Court on May 21, 22 and 26, 1986, and the
Order of the Court was entered Octoher 21, 1986.

The copy of

the Order on Order to Show Cause is attached to
Plaintiff/Respondent's Docketing Statement.

Defendant/

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on or about November 18,
1986, and Respondent filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on or
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jurisdiction

issue.

Defendant's Appeal was dismissed by

Order of the Honorable Russell W. Bench, Judge, for failure to
take action as is required by the rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals failing to file a docketing statement and a request
for transcript of certification and no transcript would be
requested.

3.

Disposition at Trial Court.

At the Order to Show Cause Hearing held in the District
Court on May 21, 22, and 26, 1986, the trial judge modified
the Decree of Divorce granting the parties joint custody,
leaving primary physical custody with Plaintiff and further
revising and defining visitation and other matters.

4.

Statement of Facts.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on or about August,
1974, and divorced on May 18, 1982.

Plaintiff was awarded

custody of the five minor children of the parties pursuant to
the Decree of Divorce entered in Box Elder County, Civil
No. 16868, with Defendant being awarded visitation.
Plaintiff married Mark Rawlings on or about December 23,
1982.

On or about June 1, 1984, Plaintiff and her new

husband, together with the minor children of the parties,
moved to Auburn, Washington, in the Seattle area, where
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Mark Rawlings had accepted employment as an engineer with
Boeing.

An Order to Show Cause hearing was held in the Box

Elder District Court on or about October 23, 1984, to modify
the Divorce Decree regarding visitation since Defendant could
no longer exercise weekend visitation rights.

The Court's

Order modifying the Divorce Decree was entered on or about
December 17, 1984.
On or about April 19, 1985, a Shelter Care Hearing was
held in the Superior Court of the State of Washington in and
for King County, Juvenile Department, No. 85-7-00307, et seq,
before Court Commissioner Steven M. Gaddis.
Court assumed &m&rgency

The Washington

jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform

Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (hereinafter "UCCJA") to
determine allegations of child abuse filed by Plaintiff
against Defendant.

At the Shelter Care hearing, the

Washington Court noted that it had assumed emergency
jurisdiction only and that if it appeared that further
litigation in Washington would be necessary to determine
custody and visitation matters, the question of jurisdiction
ne&d&d

to be reviewed in order to determine which court,

Washington or Utah, had proper jurisdiction to hear matters
relating to care, custody and visitation of the children.

The

Washington Court recommended that Counsel prepare the
appropriate motions to transfer jurisdiction to Washington and
indicated that he would confer with the Utah Court on that
matter.

Each of the parties in this action was present at the
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Shelter Care Hearing and subsequent matters in Washington and
was represented by counsel at all hearings before the
Washington Court*
On or about November 15, 1985, Plaintiff filed in the
Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County,
No. 85-3-04844-03, her "Motion for Transfer of Jurisdiction
from Utah to Washington" pursuant to Washington's version of
the UCCJA.

On or about November 15, 1985, Plaintiff's Utah

attorney filed a "Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Motion for Change of Jurisdiction" with the Utah
Court to assist the Utah Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call, in
making a determination regarding jurisdiction at such time as
Judge Call would be contacted by the Washington Court to
confer regarding

jurisdiction.

On or about December 4, 1985, Defendant, acting pro se,
had served on Plaintiff and filed in the Utah action, among
other things, a Motion for Order to Show Cause requesting that
he be awarded by the Utah Court care, custody and control of
the minor children of the parties.

At that time, no

determination had been made by either Court regarding
jurisdiction to hear such matters.

Immediately

thereafter,

Plaintiff's Utah Counsel formally filed with the Box Elder
District Court a "Motion for Change of Jurisdiction" pursuant
to the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,
Sec. 78-45c-l, et. seq., Utah Code Annotated
"U.C.A.").

(hereinafter

By the time the Order to Show Cause had been
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served on Plaintiff, the children had resided in Washington
for approximately eighteen
thirteen

<18) months.

It had been more than

(13) months since the Utah Court had heard any

matters related to the action, that hearing being related to
visitation due to the change of residence for the children.
On or about December 23, 1985, apparently after the
Washington Court had communicated by telephone with
Judge Call, the Utah Court, by VeNoy Christoffersen,

District

Judge, entered a Memorandum Decision, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by
reference, denying Plaintiff's Motion for Change of
Jurisdiction and stating as the reason for denying Plaintiff's
Motion for Change of Jurisdiction as, "since Washington has
declined to take jurisdiction."

Thereafter, or on or about

January 13, 1986, the Washington Court entered its Order
Declining Jurisdiction, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference, stating,
among other things, "that upon communication with [the Box
Elder County Court] it [meaning Box Elder] has elected and
determined to continue exercising sole and exclusive child
custody

jurisdiction."

Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to partially strike
the Utah Memorandum Decision of December 23, 1985, indicating
to Judge Christoffersen an apparent mistake or
miscommunication

in that the only reason Washington had

declined jurisdiction was because Utah had refused to

10

relinquish jurisdiction, not that Washington did not want to
exercise jurisdiction, and pointing out to the Court again
that Utah did not have jurisdiction to hear Defendant's
request for change of custody.

Plaintiff's "Motion to

Partially Strike Memorandum Decision" was denied by the Court,
the Honorable Omer J. Call, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen
concurring, on or about March 1986, again refusing to grant
Plaintiff's Motion for Change of Jurisdiction.
The matter came before the Court on May 21, 22, and
26, 1986 for determination on Defendant's request for change
of custody.

At the beginning of the trial, Plaintiff objected

to the proceeding based on the Court's lack of jurisdiction,
which objection was overruled.

Plaintiff excepted to the

Court's refusal to grant the objection, which exception was
noted by the Court.

Plaintiff renewed the objection at

various times throughout the hearing.

Following the hearing,

the District Court modified the Decree granting Defendant
joint custody, but leaving physical custody of the children
with Plaintiff and modifying and reducing visitation.
The Order on Order to Show Cause was signed by the Court
on October 21, 1986, whereafter Defendant appealed to the
Supreme Court and Plaintiff Cross Appealed based on
jurisdiction.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Plaintiff claims that the District Court had
no jurisdiction to hear any matters regarding custody of the
children pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction

Act, Section 78-45c-l, et. seq., Utah Code Annotated, in that
the children of the parties had been out of the State of Utah
almost two years by the time of the hearing held on May 21,
22, and 26, 1986, and because Utah is an inconvenient

forum.

Because the District Court has no jurisdiction, any subsequent
Order of the Court should be set aside with an Order directing
the District Court to defer jurisdiction to the State of
Washington.

ARGUMENTS
I
WASHINGTON HAS BEEN AND IS READY, WILLING AND ABLE
TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY AND VISITATION
MATTERS IN THIS ACTION AND IS THE ONLY PROPER STATE
TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY AND VISITATION

The Superior Court for King County, State of Washington,
assumed temporary emergency jurisdiction over this matter in
the State of Washington in or about March, 1985.

A Shelter

Care hearing was held on or about April 19, 1985, wherein the
Washington Court, by and through th£ Honorable Stephen M.
Gaddis, Commissioner, addressed the issue of jurisdiction
between Washington and Utah, among other things.

Commissioner

Gaddis stated at the beginning of the hearing that it was his
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opinion that jurisdiction was in Utah until jurisdiction could
be transferred to Washington.

Commissioner Gaddis also

indicated, however, that if there were a likelihood of
continued litigation, it was best to have the litigation in
one forum.

Commissioner Gaddis stated:

... If it is likely that there is going to be
ongoing litigation after that point, there is
certain value of having everything happen -well, there is always a value of having it
happen in one forum, and ordinarily you want
the forum to be in the area where the most
witnesses are, where the least financial
expense is, and these kind of things would
favor a Washington forum...I don't think
this family can afford to keep travelling to
Utah, and I am pursuaded the father cannot afford
to keep coming to Washington, hiring Washington
counsel and Utah counsel, so I think there is a
likelihood of continued litigation here and the
forum question really ought to be addressed and
I would intend to call the Utah judge to see
exactly what is happening there. And I would
intend to give each of the attorneys an
opportunity to make a presentation before there
is any kind of substantive decision on that.
But, we have got to keep expenses down -- I mean
the poor families are suffering emotionally, as
well as financially.
I respect that.
(Transcript,
pp 16-17)

In Commissioner Gaddis' Order Declining Jurisdiction, it
should be noted that the reason the Washington Court declined
jurisdiction and denied Plaintiff's Motion in Washington for
Change of Jurisdiction was that the Utah Court "refused to
relinquish jurisdiction11

(emphasis added) and the Washington

Court felt, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, that it did not have the authority to assume jurisdiction
unless or until jurisdiction was released by Utah.

In a

Clarification Order entered by Commissioner Gaddis, the
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Washington Court again stated that it would be willing to
entertain jurisdiction should the Utah Court wish to transfer
jurisdiction.

It should be noted that Plaintiff is not

requesting the Utah Court to completely divulge itself of
jurisdiction over the entire divorce case.

Plaintiff is

merely requesting the Utah Court to defer jurisdiction over
custody and visitation matters to the Washington Court and
allow the Washington Court to entertain any such motions to
modify the Decree.

Of course, the Washington Court is aware

of the procedings in Utah and is cognizant of the orders
previously entered in this matter and can make determinations
of future matters taking into account the orders entered in
Utah and granting those orders full faith and credit as if
they had been originally entered in Washington.
It should also be noted that there is a distinct
difference between having jurisdiction and exercising
jurisdiction.

In the instant action, both Utah and Washington

have jurisdiction.

However, it is important to determine

which of the two Courts should exercise jurisdiction or if
jurisdiction can be exercised concurrently.

An example is the

case of Etter v. Etter, 405 A.2d 760 (Ct. of Sp. Ap., 1979).
In that case, the Maryland Court was asked to determine
custody of a child who had resided in Delaware with his father
and had come to Maryland asking to stay in Maryland with his
mother.

At that time there was no divorce decree and each of

the parties had filed for custody.

The Maryland Trial Court

ruled that both States had jurisdiction over the matter but
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that the evidence clearly established that it was for the best
interest of the boy involved to be with his mother*

Both

Maryland and Delaware had adopted the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act and the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that
the language in the Act did not divest one court of
jurisdiction once jurisdiction had been found in another
State.

The Act deals with guiding the courts of the two

States involved and working out which is the appropriate court
to exercise jurisdiction.
The difference between the exercise of jurisdiction and
having jurisdiction is also apparent not only from the
statutes but on examination of the decision in Greene v.
Greene, 276 N. W. 2d 472 (Mich. App. 1978).

Therein the

Michigan Court of Appeals pointed out that the two district
court judges involved in Texas and Michigan had called and
spoken with each other in an effort to determine which State
should properly exercise jurisdiction.

After they had

determined that Michigan should exercise its concurrent
jurisdiction to modify the decree, it took evidence and did
so.

Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court determined

that under those circumstances, applying the same provisions
in the UCCJA as raised in this action, the Michigan court
properly exercised jurisdiction to determine the case.
Most of the cases interpreting the UCCJA have been
incidents were one parent has abducted the children and
secreted them from the other parent and then attempted to
modify a custody decree of another state months or years
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later.

Although not directly on point, since in the

instant action there has never been an incidence of abduction
and all matters of custody and visitation have been handled
properly through the Courts, the cases do offer some insight
into the intent and purpose of the UCCJA and may be of
assistance to this Court in rendering a decision.
For example, in the case Settle vs. Settle, 556 P.2d 962
(Or., 1976), the mother was attempting to modify in Oregon a
custody decree which was entered in Indiana.

The decree was

originally entered, in the mother's absence after she had left
Indiana with the children.

However, the action had been

commenced prior to the mother's leaving Indiana for Oregon.
The trial court had originally allowed jurisdiction and
modified the custody decree.

The Oregon Appeals Court then

overturned the trial court and the Appeals Court was
subsequently overturned by the Oregon Supreme Court,
reinstating the decision of the trial court that

jurisdiction

was proper in Oregon.
In determining whether Oregon had jurisdiction to modify
the decree,

the Supreme Court of Oregon followed a two tiered

determination, first determining if jurisdiction were proper
in Oregon and then determining if jurisdiction should be
maintained by Oregon.

As noted by the Court, the two main

factors for determining jurisdiction as mentioned in the UCCJA
are:

(1)

If the state is the home state of the children at

the time of commencement of the action, or (2)
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If it is in

the best interest of the child that the court assumes
jurisdiction because the child and at least one contestant
have a significant connection with the state and there is
available in the state potential evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships.
The Oregon Court determined that the necessary
threshholds had been met to establish jurisdiction since the
children had been in Oregon for at least six (6) consecutive
months prior to the commencement of the proceedings and hence,
Oregon was the children's home state.

In determining whether

the Court should exercise its jurisdiction, the Court noted,
in reference to the second tier of the test, the "significant
connection test" that:
One parent [the father] certainly has a significant
connection with Indiana, and there is available
there substantial evidence concerning the
children's relationship with that parent and,
thus, the future care, protection, training,
and personal relationships if they are to be
returned to Indiana. However, at the time
of the hearing by the trial court the children
had no significant connection with Indiana because
of the length of time they had been away.
In the
lives of children four and eight years of age,
eighteen months is a long time. 556 P.2d at 966.

It should be noted that in the instant action, the
children had resided in Washington almost two years by the
time of hearing held on May 21, 1986.
The Oregon Supreme Court also reviewed the Commissioner's
Note, 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 107, 108, Section 3 (Master Ed.
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1973), dealing with the UCCJA which contained the following:

Paragraph <2) Cthe significant connection test] perhaps
more than any other provision of the Act requires
that it be interpreted in the spirit of the
legislative purposes expressed in section 1.
The paragraph was phrased in general terms in
order to be flexible enough to cover many fact
situations too diverse to lend themselves to
exact description.
But its purpose is to limit
jurisdiction rather than proliferate it*
The
first clause of the paragraph is important:
Jurisdiction exists only if it is in the
child's interest, not merely the interest or
convenience of the fueding parties, to determine
custody in the particular state.
The interest of
the child is served when the forum has optimum
access to relevant evidence of the child and
family.
There must be maximum rather than minimum
contact with the State. The submission of the
parties to a forum, perhaps for purposes of divorce,
is not sufficient without additional factors
establishing closer ties with the State.
Divorce
jurisdiction does not necessarily include custody
jurisdiction.
See Clark, Domestic Relations 578
(1968) (emphasis in original) 556 P.2d at 966.
The Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that the
significant connection test, which includes an examination of
the best interests of the children, was one of the most
important factors in determining whether Oregon should
exercise its jurisdiction.

The Court also noted that the

Commissioners Note comment indicated that the requirement of
the availability of "substantial evidence" should be
understood to require optimum access to relevant evidence.
The Court determined that since the children had been in
Oregon for eighteen months, Indiana no longer had optimum
access to relevant evidence.
It should also be noted that even though the court where
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the divorce decree and custody determination were originally
entered is the original court of jurisdiction, there are some
occasions when the court of original jurisdiction either
should not exercise its jurisdiction or has lost its
jurisdiction.

In McCarron v. Dist. Crt. in and for Jefferson

Cty. , 671 P. 2d 953 (Col. 1983), the father and mother were
married in 1974 in New Jersey.

On July 1, 1976, a divorce

decree was granted upon the mother's petition by an Oklahoma
District Court and she was awarded the custody of the parties
child.

The father later moved from New Jersey to Colorado in

1981 where the son made several visits to his father and
eventually in August, 1982, it was decided that the son would
be entered in school in Colorado.

The mother thereafter moved

to Texas and in May, 1983, or approximately nine months after
the son had been with his father, the mother removed the child
from school without the father's knowledge or consent and took
the child to Texas.

The father thereafter immediately filed

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and a verified petition for
custody pursuant to the Colorado provisions of the UCCJA.
Colorado court then conferred with the Oklahoma court
whereupon the Oklahoma judge stated that he would retain
jurisdiction on issues of custody, support and visitation.
Based on the Oklahoma court's statement, the Colorado court
declined jurisdiction.
On an appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, the Court
noted, as had the Oregon Supreme Court, the two distinct
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The

inquiries which should be made in order to determine whether a
Colorado district court should hear a child custody case under
the UCCJA.

The first is whether jurisdiction exists in the

state and the second is whether the state should exercise its
jurisdiction.

The Colorado Supreme Court determined that

jurisdiction did exist since the child had lived in Colorado
for more than six months and Colorado had become the child's
home state.
In determining whether jurisdiction should be exercised,
the Colorado Supreme Court stated that before modifying a
decree of another state, the Colorado court must find either
that <i) the original state no longer has jurisdiction or (2)
that the other state has declined to assume jurisdiction.

In

that case, of course, the second criteria was not applicable
because Oklahoma had said that it desired to retain
jurisdiction.

In determining if Oklahoma still had

jurisdiction, the Colorado court noted that the provisions of
the UCCJA state that the original state shall have continuing
jurisdiction as long as it is excerising

jurisdiction

substantially in conformance with the UCCJA.

The court noted

that original jurisdiction could be lost by the erosion of
child and parent significant connections with the state.
In holding that Colorado should properly exercise its
jurisdiction and that Oklahoma no longer had jurisdiction,
Colorado Supreme Court stated that:
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the

...We must keep in mind the other policies of the
Act, namely, that litigation concerning the child take
place in the state with which the child and his
family have the closest connection and where
significant evidence concerning the child is
available.
Clearly, the best interest of the
child would not be served through the exercise
of jurisdiction by Oklahoma in this case.
The
child has not resided in that state for nine
months at the time the father filed the petition
and neither the parents nor the child now live
there.
We hold that the exercise of jurisdiction by a
Colorado court is appropiate because Oklahoma
no longer has jurisdiction.
The district court
abused its discretion by deferring to the
jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court. We therefore
make the rule absolute. 671 P.2d at 957, 958.

In another Colorado case, In Re Custody of Dunn, 701 P.2d
158 <Colo. App., 1985), the Colorado Appeals Court held that
where the natural parents of a child were divorced by a Texas
decree but the child, after the death of his father, had lived
with his stepmother for six months in Colorado prior to the
filing by the stepmother of a petition for custody, and that
the child and stepmother had significant connections with
Colorado, Colorado had jurisdiction as the home state of the
child, and Texas, under its version of the UCCJA, did not have
home state jurisdiction nor significant connection
jurisdiction, and therefore Texas no longer had jurisdiction
and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to
exercise jurisdiction.
In the Dunn case, the parents had separated and the
mother and son had moved to Texas.
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In March of 1980, the

mother permitted the son to travel to California for an
overnight visit with his father.

The father did not return

the child to Texas and the son stayed with the father and his
father's girlfriend.

In September of 1980, the mother

obtained a divorce decree in Texas in which she was awarded
custody.
father.

However, the child continued to reside with his
The father and his girlfriend were married in 1981.

The father was killed in an automobile accident in 1983,
whereafter the stepmother and the son moved to Colorado.
After being in Colorado for six months, the stepmother filed a
petition seeking custody of the son.

The trial court

determined that it had home state jurisdiction because the
child had resided in Colorado for six months and because the
ties to Colorado made it in the best interest of the child for
Colorado to assume jurisdiction.

However, the trial court

communicated with the Texas court of original jurisdiction and
was advised by the Texas court that it felt it still had
jurisdiction to consider any modifications of its custody
order.

The Colorado court thereafter ruled that it was

precluded from modifying the Texas decree because Texas still
had jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Appellate Court ruled that the trial court
had correctly determined that because the child and stepmother
had significant connections with Colorado, and because there
was substantial evidence concerning the child in Colorado, it
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was in the best interest for Colorado to assume jurisdiction.
However, the Appellate Court did not agree with the trial
court in ruling that Texas still had jurisdiction.

The Court

noted the provisions of the Texas version of the UCCJA which
are similiar to Section 78-45-3, UCA, particularly noting a
provision in the Texas Act that states:

"If it appears that

no other state would have jurisidiction under Subdivision
of subdivision

(a) of this section."

(1)

That provision is

similar to Section 78-45-3<d) of the Utah Act.

The Court then

stated:

Under the Texas statute, because the child did
not live in Texas at anytime during the six
months prior to commencement of the Colorado
custody proceedings, it is not entitled to
jurisdiction under the "home state" provision
of the [Texas Act]. Further it does not appear
that Texas had jurisdiction under...the
"significant connection" provision, because
unlike the comparable Colorado statute
[citation omitted] the Texas statute does not
permit "significant connection" jurisdiction
where another state has "home state"
jurisdiction..., and here, Colorado has
such jurisdiction.
In addition, the child's
contact with Texas has become slight, and
substantial evidence concerning his welfare
is present here: thus, modification of
jurisdiction should shift to Colorado.

The Court concluded by noting with dissatisfaction
earlier cases which held that the court which enters the
original custody order will always have jurisdiction, and
stating that such rulings were overly broad and overlooked the
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intent and purpose of the UCCJA and that under certain
circumstances the state of original jurisdiction can and
should lose jurisdiction.
Plaintiff has been unable to find a Utah case on point
dealing with jurisdiction for custody modification under the
UCCJA.

However, in McLane vs. McLane, 570 P.2d 692, the Utah

Supreme Court held that notwithstanding that courts of one
state have acquired original jurisdiction over children, such
as by way of custody awards on divorce, a judgment that had
been entered therein does not mean that the original state
retains permanent and exclusive control over them.

The Utah

Supreme Court noted the need of children for sustenance and
protective care is continuous and, hence, properly

interested

parties may invoke the jurisdiction of a court based on either
the domicile of the child, the presence of the child within
the state or in personam jurisdiction over the parties seeking
custody, and any one of those would be sufficient foundation
for the court to hear and determine the controversy.

In other

words, the Supreme Court of Utah has recognized, similar to
the rulings in McCarron and Dunn, that original jurisdiction
is not in and of itself sufficient to allow a state to retain
permanent jurisdiction

indefinitely.

In the instant action, the original decree was entered in
1982 in Utah.

The children moved to Washington with their

mother and stepfather in June of 1984 and have continuously
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resided in the State of Washington since June, 1984 P

which is

currently more than three years and was a period of almost two
years at the time the hearing, which was held on May 21, 22
and 26, 1986.

The family moved to Washington so that the

stepfather could accept employment with Boeing*

The move to

Washington was not an attempt to in a:r :iy way sidestep the
jurisdiction of the Utah Court.
In short, Utah simply has no significant connections,
other than the Defenda n t * s presence i i i 1 11 a 1 :t, i n o i d e i t o
exercise jurisdiction.

Utah has neither "home state"

jurisdiction nor "significant connection" jursidiction as
outlined in the Dui n i case.

On the othei hand, the State of

Washington is the childrens' home state since they have
resided there for more than six months and Washington has
numerous, and has the most substantial and significant
connections with all of the parties in this action,

including

the Defendant, who has been involved in several hearings in
Washington and has been represented by an attorney in
Washington actions.

Furthermore the "substantial evidence"

that would be necessar y t o properly hear a custody
determination is found only in the State of Washington.

It is

clearly in the best interest of the children for jurisdiction
to be maintained only in the Sta te of Washington.

And,, as

stated in the UCCJA, it is the best interest of the children
which is controlling and not the interests of the parties to
the action nor the interests of the Court.
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In fact, the

purpose and intent of the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction

Act dictate that Utah defer jurisdiction to Washington for
custody and visitation matters and allow the Washington Court
to make a determination on any such matters.

II
WASHINGTON IS THE MOST CONVENIENT
FORUM TO DETERMINE ISSUES REGARDING
CUSTODY AND VISITATION OF THE CHILDREN

In addition to the requirements which must be met in
order for District Court in this State to exercise
jurisdiction

(as outlined in UCA 78-45c-3and

previoulsy

discussed), Section 78-45c-7 of the Act lists several factors
which should be considered by the Court in deciding whether to
exercise jurisdiction on the basis of forum nonconveniens:
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient
forum, the court shall consider if it is in the interest
of the child that another state assume jurisdiction.
For this purpose it may take into account the following
factors, among others:
<a) If another state is, or recently was, the
child's home state?
<b) If another state has a closer connection with
the child and his family or with the child and one or
more of the contestants;
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's
present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships is more readily available in
another state;
<d) If the parties have agreed on another forum
which is no less appropriate; and
<e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of
this state would contravene any purposes stated in
Section 78-45c-l.
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In conjunction with those considerations, of the purposes
listed in the beginning of the Act, of greatest importance are
the following found in Section 78-45c-l:
<c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody
of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which
the child and his family have the closest connection and
where significant evidence concerning his care,
protection, training, and personal relationships as most
readily available, and as Courts of this state decline
the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his
family have a closer connection with another state;
(d) Discourage continuing controversies over child
custody in the interest of greater stability of home
environment and of secure family relationships for the
child.
In reviewing the factors listed in Subsection 7 of the
Act 978-45c-7) and applying those I: o I: he s t a teci p 1 ir poses of
the Act found in Subsection 1 <78-45c-l), it is clear that, in
the instant action, the State of Washington is far and above
the most convenient forum.

As previously stated, those

factors include:
1.

Washington is the children's home state, it was

the children's home state for nearly 2 years at the time
the hearing was held in May of 1986, and has now been the
children's home state in excess of 3 years.

<As stated

earlier, the children moved to Washington in June of
1984).
2.

Ihe only connection Utah has with the children

is their father and maternal grandparents.

All other

connections are found in Washington, eg. friends,
neighbors, school teachers, principals,
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ecclesiastical

leaders, doctors, therapists, psychologists, etc.
3.

Any evidence, except as may be provided by the

children's father, concerning the children's present and
future care, protection, training and personal
relationships is more readily available in Washington.
4.

The exercise of jurisdiction by the District

Court in this action seriously contravenes the purposes
stated in the Act.

One purpose of the Act is to assure

that litigation concerning the custody of a child take
place ordinarily in the State with which the child and
his family have the closest connection and where
significant evidence concerning his care, protection,
training, and personal relationships as most readily
available and that the COURTS OF THIS STATE

[SHOULD]

DECLINE THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION WHEN THE CHILD AND
HIS FAMILY HAVE A CLOSER CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER STATE.
U.C.A. Section 7 8 - 4 5 C - K c )

(emphasis added).

major purpose is to discourage continuing

Another

controversy

over child custody in the interest of greater stability
of home environment and of secure family
with the child.

relationships

Prior to the hearing upon which this

appeal is based, the parties have appeared in Court on
various matters in excess of 12 times.

In addition, even

after this appeal had been filed, the Defendant has filed
a petition to modify the Divorce Decree again requesting
custody of the children.

As can be seen, the purposes of
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the Act are not being met by allowing the District Court
to maintain jurisdiction over this action.

Plaintiff readily admits that the trial court should be
granted great latitude when applying the factors indicated in
Subsection 7 of the Act to determine if jurisdiction should be
exercised on the basis of convenience.

In this action,

however, the Trial Court has greatly abused its discretion by
failing to properly apply the factors stated i n t he Act to the
facts of the instant action and by failing to follow the
general purpose as stated in the Act
ruling of the Supreme Court of

•-

Tn contrast to the
^

•I ^

ADV. REP. 30, Plaintiff has shown that the interest of the
children would be better served by relinquishing

jurisdiction

to Washington and that it is severely prejudicial to both
Plaintiff and the children to refuse to do so.

Plaintiff has

further shown that all necessary and relevant evidence
concerning custody matters can be found only in Washington.

It should be further noted that even though the Trial
Court has discretion in applying the factors stated in
Subsection 7 of the Act in determining jurisdictional matters,
the Trial Court does not have dicretion to determine if the
Court has jurisdiction as required in Subsection 3 of the
Act.

The Act requires that specific conditions be met in

order for this Court to maintain jurisdiction.
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Those

conditions include (See LLC,A. Section 78-45c-l<a) (b) <c> and
<d>. (a) if this state is the home state of the child;

<b) the

best interest of the child and the child has significant
connections with the state?
child in the state?

id)

(c) the physical presence of the

if no other state has jurisdiction.

The State of Utah simply does not meet any of those criteria
as stated in the Act.
state of the children.

Washington, and not Utah, is the home
Washington, and not Utah, has the most

substantial connections with the children.

In fact, Utah's

connections with the children are relatively insignificant and
there is no evidence, let alone substantial evidence,
concerning the children's care, protection, training and
personal relationships.

Furthermore, none of the children is

present in this state and it is absolutely clear that
Washington does have grounds to exercise jurisdiction.
Therefore, even if this Court were to conclude that the Trial
Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to properly
consider the factors in determining whether to exercise
jurisdiction, this Court must conclude that the basis
necessary for the District Court to exercise jurisdiction in
this action have not been met and that the District Court
simply no longer has jurisdiction over the children.
It must also be noted that the Honorable Omer J. Call,
the District Court Judge who has heard all matters relative to
this action in Utah, has retired effective July 31, 1987, and
will no longer hear any matters relative hereto, further
weakening any claim by Defendant or the District Court that
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jurisdiction be maintained in Utah since the trial judge who
is familiar with the case will no longer be sitting on the
case.

Thus, a judge in Washinton is as well qualified and as

familiar with the case, if not more familiar with the case
because of the Shelter Care Hearings in Washington, than the
new judge appointed in the Utah First District.

CONCLUSIONS

The Court's refusal to grant Plaintiff's Motion for
Change of Jurisdiction and subsequent refusal tu qrant
Plaintiff's objections to jurisdiction at the time of the
hearing is manifest error in that the Utah District Court
clearly had no jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act to make any determinations regarding custody,
visitation or other matters relevant to the children.

Such

matters can be and should be determined only by the Superior
Court in Washington where the children currently reside and
have been residing now for several years.
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter an
Order setting aside the Order on Order to Show Cause entered
by the Court on or about October 21, 1986, for lack of
jurisdiction and further ordering this Court to defer any
matters relevant to custody, visitation and other matters
relative to the children to the Washington Superior Court.
DATED this _£_.!_ day of August, 1987.

St;epkj&iY W.
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J

Jewell

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing BRIEF OF CROSS APPELLANT to Mark Weiner, Pro Se,
665 South 700 West, Brigham City, Utah

84302 and deposited

the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid envelope this
2-1*

day of August, 1987.

^A^id^p- J^J<L04<J(^-
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VUUAISLLI

ADDENDUM

1.

Copy of Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,

UCA 78-45c-l, et. seq.
2.

Copy of December 23, 1985 Memorandum Decision from

Judge Christoffersen.
3.

Copy of Washington Court's Order Declining

Jurisdiction.
4.

Copy of the Order on Order to Show Cause dated

October 21, 1986.
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Judicial Code

become subject to a collection action to satisfy the
support debt.
i*>s
Tt-45b-17.l. Pasting or bond or security for
payment of support debt.
OKa) The department shall, or an obligee may,
petition the court for an order requiring an obligor
to post a bond or provide other security for the
payment of a support debt, when the department or
an obligee determines that action is appropriate, if
the payments are more than 90 days delinquent. The
department shall establish rules for determining
when it shall seek an order for security.
(b) For purposes of this section, 'support debt"
includes court ordered obligations for the support of
a spouse or former spouse with whom the child
resides, if that support is collected with the child
support.
(2) When the department or an obligee petitions
ibe court under this section, it shall give written
notice to the obligor, stating:
(a) the amount of support debt;
(b) that it has petitioned the court for an order
requiring the obligor to post security; and
(c) that the obligor has the right to appear
before the court and contest the department's or
obligee's petition.
(3) After notice to the obligor and an opportunity
for a hearing, the court shall order a bond posted or
other security to be deposited upon the department's or obligee's showing of a support debt and
of a reasonable basis for the security.
IMS
Tt-45b-lS. Extensions of time for good cause
authorized - Service of docuameaU.
(1) Whenever, for good cause, it appears that an
extension of time should be given in relation to any
proceedings under this act, the same shall be
granted.
(2) The manner provided for service of any documents under this act shall be in addition to other
manners of service provided by law.
wis
7t-45b-19. Actions Involving orders prohibited
unless ptaaatJlf applies to departaacat for bearing.
No action, proceeding, or suit to set aside, vacate,
or amend an order issued under this chapter, may
be brought unless the plaintiff first applies to the
department for a hearing on every issue to be presented in the action, proceeding, or suit.
MM
7S-45b-20. Conflict of orders.
If any order pursuant to this act is, or becomes,
in conflict with any order of a court of competent
jurisdiction, to the extent of such conflict the court
order shall govern.
wn
7S-4Sb-21. Charge off of uacollectibk support
debts.
The department may charge off as uncollectible
any support debt upon which it finds there is no
available, practical and lawful means by which that
debt may be collected and may transfer those accounts from accounts receivable to a suspense account
and cease to account for them as assets.
ins
7t-4Sb-22. Repealed.
IMS
7S-45b-23. Medical and dental expenses of
dependent children • Assigning respousibUity for
paysaeat - Insurance coverage provtsloa la
order.
In any action under this chapter the department
or the administrative hearing examiner shall include
in its order a provision assigning responsibility for
the payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children. If
coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the dep-

artment or the examiner may also include a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for (hose children.
ifU
7S-45b-24. Provision of support debt information
to consumer reporting agency.
(1) As used in this section, "consumer reporting
agency" means any person who, for monetary fees,
dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly
assembles or evaluates consumer credit information
bearing on credit worthiness, standing or capacity,
for the purpose of furnishing consumer credit
reports to third parties.
(2) The department shall supply information regarding a support debt in excess of $1,000 to any
consumer reporting agency only upon its request.
(3) The department may supply information regarding a support debt of $1,000 or less to a consumer reporting agency only upon its request.
(4) Before it supplies any information to a consumer reporting agency under this section, the department shall give written notice to the obligor,
specifying the information which will be disclosed to
the consumer reporting agency and providing the
obligor with a reasonable opportunity to contest the
accuracy of the information in an administrative
bearing.
(5) The department shall establish rules implementing this section.
(6) The department may charge the consumer
reporting agency a fee for furnishing information
under this section. That fee may not exceed the
department's actual cost of providing the information.
(7) The notice provisions of this section do not
apply to a support debt which has been reduced to
judgment and is public information.
mt
7S-45b-25. Information received from State Tax
Commission to be provided to other states'
collection agencies.
The Office of Recovery Services shall, upon
request, provide to any other state's child support
collection agency the information which it receives
from the State Tax Commission under Subsection 5910-545(2), with regard to a support debt which
that agency is involved in enforcing.
mt
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78-45c-3.

sion and court orders and instructions providing for
the custody of a child, including visitation rights; n
does not include a decision relating to child support
or any other monetary obligation of any person;
7S-4Sc-l4. Moditkadoa of lorriga decree (3) "Custody proceeding* includes proceedings in
PrrreqaJsiles • Factors coasMercd.
which a custody determination is one of several
7 M 5 C - I 5 . FUJag foreiga decree - Effect issues,
such as an action for dissolution of marriage,
EaforccaKBt • Award of expenses.
or legal separation, and includes child neglect and
7ft-45c-lo. Registry ataialateed by clerk of coart Docasaeet* catered.
dependency proceedings;
7f-45r-J7. Certified copies of decreet feraisbed by derfc
(4) 'Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody
of coart.
determination contained in a judicial decree or order
7 M S c - l s . Taklog tesdsaoay of persoas la other states.
made in a custody proceeding, and includes aa
7fl-45c-i*. Reqaest to coart of soother state to lake
initial decree and a modification decree;
evidence, to snake stadlcs or to order appears ace of party
(5) "Home state" means the state in which the
• Paysaeat of costs.
child immediately preceding the time involved lived
7 * - * 5 c - » . Taklog evldeacc for as* ka coart of soother
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as
state - Orderiag appcaraacc la aaolher state Eaforcesaeat - Coats.
parent, for at least six consecutive months, and i s
7f-45c-21. Prescnradoa of records of proceedta** •
the case of a child less than six months old the state
Faraishiag copies to other state courts.
in which the child lived from birth with any of the
7s-4Sc-22. ReqnestlBg coart records frees aaother state.
persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of
7M5C-23. Foreiga coaatrlcs - AppNcadoo of geaeral
any of the named persons are counted as part of the
six-month or other period;
TMSc-24. Priority oa coart caleadar.
(6) "Initial decree" means the first custody decree
7M5c-23. Notices • Orders to appear - Maaacr of
concerning a particular child;
7»-45c-24. Short title.
(7) "Modification decree" means a custody decree
which modifies or replaces a prior decree, whether
made by the court which rendered the prior decree
7*-45c-l. Purposes - Coastrvctioa.
(1) The general purposes of this act are to:
I or by another court;
(8) "Physical custody" means actual possession
(a) Avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict I
with courts of other states in matters of child I and control of a child;
(9) "Person acting as parent* means a person,
custody which have in the past resulted in the shifother than a parent, who has physical custody of a
ting of children from state to state with harmful
child and who has either been awarded custody by
effects on their well-being;
(b) Promote cooperation with the courts of I the court or claims a right to custody; and
(10) "State" means any state, territory or possesother states to the end that a custody decree is rension of the United States, the Commonwealth of
dered in that state which can best decide the case in
Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
tsas
the interest of the child;
(c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody I 7S-45c-3. Bases of jarisdictJoa M this state.
of a child take place ordinarily in the state with I
(1) A court of this state which is competent to
which the child and his family have the closest j decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to
connection and where significant evidence concer- I make a child custody determination by initial or
ning his care, protection, training, and personal I modification decree if the conditions as set forth ia
relationships is most readily available, and that I any of the following paragraphs are met:
courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdic- I
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child
hon when the child and his family have a closer I at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or
connection with another state;
[ (it) had been the chad's home state within sn
(d) Discourage continuing controversies over I months before commencement of the proceeding
child custody in the interest of greater stability of I and the child is absent from this state because of his
removal or retention by a person claiming his
home environment and of secure family relationscustody or for other reasons, and a parent or person
hips for the child;
(e) Deter abductions and other unilateral rem- I acting as parent continues to live in this state;
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a
ovals of children undertaken to obtain custody I
court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the
•wards;
( 0 Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of I child and his parents, or the child and at least one
other states in this state insofar as feasible;
I contestant, have a significant connection with this
(g) Facilitate the enforcement of custody I state, and (ii) there is available in this state substadecrees of other states;
I ntial evidence concerning the child's present or
(h) Promote and expand the exchange of info- I future care, protection, training, and personal relahnation and other forms of mutual assistance I tionships;
(c) The child is physically present in this state
between the courts of this state and those of other I
"ales concerned with the same child; and
I and (i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) U is
(i) To make uniform the law of those states I necessary in an emergency to protect the child
*Wch enact it.
I because he has been subjected to or threatened wish
(2) This title shall be construed to promote the I mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or
•"•eral purposes stated in this section.
MM I dependent; or
*-4Sc-2. Definitions.
(dX«) It appears that no other state would have
As used in this act:
I jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in acc(1) "Contestant" means a person, including a I ordance with paragraphs (a), (b), or (c), or another
jtocm, who claims a right to custody or visitation I state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
>
VHs with respect to a child;
I ground that this state is the more appropriate forum
(2) "Custody determination' means a court deci- I to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is «
the best interest of the child that this court assume
7S-4Sc-12. Parties bouad by custody decree Coodasive Males* ojodtfled.
7 M 5 c - l 3 . Recogallioa aod eaforceaseat of foreiga

fe?82-
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Judicial

(3) If the coun is informed during the course of
jurisdiction.
I
(2) Except wider paragraphs (c) and (d) of subs- I the proceeding that a proceeding concerning the
ection (I), physical presence in this s u t e of the I custody of the child was pending in another state
child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is I before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay
not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court I the proceeding and communicate with the court in
of this state to aaake a child custody determination.
I which the other proceeding is pending to the end
that the issue may be litigated in the more approp(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable,
is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his I riate forum and that information be exchanged in
custody.
MM I accordance with sections 78~45c-19 through 7845c-22 If a court of this state has made a custody
7M5c-4. Peranas to be notified and heard.
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable I decree before being informed of a pending proceenotice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to I ding in a court of another state it shall immediately
the contestants, any parent whose parental rights I inform that court of the fact. If the court is infohave not bean previously terminated, and any I rmed thai a proceeding was commenced in another
person who has physical custody of the child If any I state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise
of these persons is outside this state, notice and I inform the other court to the end that the issues
opportunity an be heard shall be given pursuant to I may be litigated in the more appropriate forum, MM
7t-45c-7. Declining Jnrlamrttaa oa finding of
section 78-45o5.
MM
tncoaveakot fonua • Factors la deterauaatioa
78-4SC-S. Sendee of notice outside state - Proof
- Comaaafeatioa with other eoart - Awarding
of service - Shwaalscioa to jnrisdictfoa.
(1) Notice acquired for the exercise of jurisdiction I
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act
over a person outside this state shall be given in a I
manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, I to make an initial or modification decree may
and may be naade in any of the following ways:
I decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before
(a) By personal delivery outside this state in the I making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient
manner prescribed for service of process within this I fonun to make a custody determination under the
state;
I circumstances of the case and that a court of
(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the I another sute is a more appropriate fonun.
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made
place in which the service is made for service of I
process in that place in an action in any of its courts I upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a
of general jurisdiction;
I party or a guardian ad litem or other representative
(c) By assy form of mail addressed to the person I of the child.
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum,
IO he served ami requesting a receipt; or
J
(d) As detected by the court (including public- I the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the
ation, if other means of notification are ineffective). I child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this
(2) Notice under this section shall be served, I purpose it may take into account the following
factors, among others:
mailed, delivered, or last published at least 10 days
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's
before any hearing in this state.
I
home state;
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be
(b) If another state has a closer connection with
made by affidavit of the individual who made the I
service, or in the manner prescribed by the law of I the child and his family or with the child and one or
this state, the order pursuant to which the service is I more of the contestants;
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the
made, or the law of the place in which the service is I
made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a 1 child's present or future care, protection, training,
receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of J and personal relationships is more readily available
delivery to the addressee.
J in another state;
(d) If the parties have agreed on another forum
(4) Notice k not required if a person submits to I
the juriidkaien of the court.
m a I which U no kas appropriate; and
(e) If the exerdse of jurisdiction by a court of
7S-45c-«. l W < i a i a g i pending elsewhere •
this state would contravene any of the purposes
Jurisdiction not exercised - laqaJry to other state
stated
in section 78-45c-l.
• Infsrsnaaaa exchange • Stay of proceeding
I
(4) Before detennining whether to decline or
• a notice af another proceeding.
I
retain
jurisdiction the court may communicate with
(1) A coast of this state shall not exercise its jur- I
itchamo wader this Met if at the time of filing the I a court of another state and exchange information
petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the I pertinent to the assumption of jurisdiction by either
child was landing in a court of another state exer- I court with a view to assuring that jurisdiction wffl
cising jurieetction substantially in conformity with I be exercised by the more appropriate court and that
a forum will be available to the parties.
this act, unless the proceeding is staved by the court
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient
of the other state because this state is a more appropriate fotaaa or for other reasons.
I forum and that a court of another state is a more
(2) Befoae hearing the petition in a custody proc- I appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings,
ceding the court shall examine the pleadings and I or it may stay the proceedings upon condition that a
»
other infonnation supplied by the parties under I custody proceeding be promptly commenced
another named state or upon any other c o n d i t | 0 ! f
section 7*-45c-10 and shall consult the child
which
may
be
just
and
proper,
including
the
condicustody segistry established under section 78-4Sc- I
16 conccsaang the pendency of proceedings with I tion that a moving party stipulate his consent and
submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum.
respect t o the child in other states. If the court has
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdicreason to believe that proceedings may be pending
tion under this act if a custody determination •»
in another state it shall direct an inquiry to the state
incidental
to an action for divorce or another proccourt adnamistrator or other appropriate official of
eeding while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce
the other state.
or other proceeding.
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(7) if it appears to the court that it is clearly an
inappropriate forum it may require the party who
commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to
the costs of the proceedings in this state, necessary
travel and other expenses, including attorney's fees,
incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment
is to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance to the proper party.
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under
this section the court shall inform the court found
to be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if
the court which would have jurisdiction in the other
state is not certainly known, shall transmit the information to the court administrator or other appropriate official for forwarding to the appropriate
court.
(9) Any communication received from another
sute informing this sute of a finding of inconvenient forum because a court of this s u t e is the more
appropriate forum shall be filed in the custody registry of the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction the court of this sute shall inform the original court of this fact.
MM
78-45c-S. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for
refusing Jurisdiction - Notice to another
Jurisdiction - Ordering petitioner to appear in
other court or to return child • Awarding costs.
(1) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another state or has
engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court
may decline to exercise jurisdiction for purposes of
adjudication of custody if this is just and proper
under the circumstances.
(2) Unless required in the interest of the child, the
court shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a
custody decree of another s u t e if the petitioner,
without consent of the person entitled to custody
has improperly removed the child from the physical
custody of the person entitled to custody or has
improperly retained the child after a visit or other
temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If the
petitioner has violated any other provision of a
custody decree of another state the court may
decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this u just and
proper under the circumstances.
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdiction upon petition for an initial custody decree
pursuant to subsection (1), the court shall notify the
parent or other appropriate person and the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction in the
other sute. If a request to that effect is received
from the other sute, the court shall order the petitioner to appear with the child in a custody proceeding instituted in the other sute La accordance with
•action 78-45c-20. If no such request is made
•ithin a reasonable time after such notification, the
court may entertain a petition to determine custody
by the petitioner if it has jurisdiction pursuant to
•ection 78-45C-2.
(4) Where the court refuses to assume jurisdiction
10
modify the custody decree of another sute pursuant to subsection (2) or pursuant to section 784
* H 4 , the court shall notify the person who has
*tal custody under the decree of the other sute and i
*•* prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdi- I
ctioti in the other sute and may order the petitioner
** return the child to the person who has legal
^ o d y . If it appears that the order wiU be ineffe***** and the legal custodian u ready to receive the
* " d within a period of a few days, the court may j
"*ct the child in a foster care home for such
Uf^od, pending return of the child to the legal cus&?»Co
" * * Uak
For A n n o t a t i o n s , consult Coi
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lodian. At the same time, the court shall advise the
petitioner that any petition for modification of
custody must be directed to the appropriate court oj
the other sute which has continuing jurisdiction, or.
in the event that that court declines jurisdiction, to *
court in a sute which has jurisdiction pursuant i©
section 78-45c-3.
(5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this section may charge the petitioner
with necessary travel and other expenses, indudi&{
attorney's fees and the cost of returning the child to
another sute.
r*w
78-45c-9. Information as to custody of child and
litigation concerning required la pleadings Verification • Continuing duty lo inform court.
(1) Every party in a custody proceeding in his fire
pleading or in an affidavit attached to that pleading
shall give information under oath as to the child'i
present address, the places where the child has bvec
within the last five years, and the names and prcsetr
addresses of the persons with whom the child h*j
lived during that period. In this pleading or affidavc
every party shall further declare under oath as to
each of the following whether:
(a) He has participated, as a party, witness, or
in any other capacity, in any other litigation concerning the custody of the same child in this or am
other sute;
(b) He has infonnation of any custody proceeding concerning the child pending in a court of th&
or any other sute; and
(c) He knows of any person not a party to tie
proceedings who has physical custody of the child or
claims to have custody or visitation rights w e t
respect to the child.
(2) If the declaration as to any of the above items
is in the affirmative the declarant shall gtve addmonal information under oath as required by the
court. The court may examine the parties under
oath as to details of the information furnished mot
as to other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.
(3) Each party has a continuing duty to infant
the court of any custody proceeding concerning tfat
child in this or any other sute of which he obtained
information during this proceeding.
»n
7t-45c-10. Joinder of persons having custody or
claiming custody or vtsiution rights.
If the court learns from information furnished fcj
the parties pursuant to section 78-45c-9 or from
other sources that a person not a party to rht
custody proceeding has physical custody o f the chut
or claims to have custody or visiution rights wift
respect to the child, it shall order that person to fct
joined as a party and to be duly notified of ire
pendency of the proceeding and of his joinder as «
party. If the person joined as a party is outside ttra
state he shall be served with process or otherwMe
notified m accordance with section 78-4Sc-S.
tm
7S-45c.ll. Ordering party to appear Eafofcesaeat • Oat-of-state party - Travel
expense.
(I) The court may order any party to the procesding who is in this s u t e to appear personally before
the court If that party has physical custody of the
child the court may order that he appear personal*
with the child. If the party who is ordered to appear
with the child cannot be served or fails to obey tte
order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, tie
court may issue a warrant of arrest against sua
party to secure his appearance with the child.
• C o ' s Annotation Service
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mi'im

witnesses
was
(2) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is
78-45c-16. Registry maintained by clerk of court
desired by the court is outside this state with or
•
Documents
entered.
without the child the court may order that the notice
The clerk of each district court shall maintain a
given under section 78-4Sc-S include a statement I
registry in which he shall enter all of the following:
directing that party to appear personally with or
(1) Certified copies of custody decrees of other
without the child and declaring that failure to
states received for filing;
appear may result in a decision adverse to that
(2) Communications as to the pendency of
party.
(3) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this I custody proceedings in other states;
(3) Communications concerning a finding of incstate is directed to appear under subsection (2) or I
desires to appear personally before the court with or I onvenient forum by a court of another state; and
(4) Other communications or documents concerwithout the child, the court may require another I
party to pay to the clerk of the court travel and ( ning custody proceedings in another state which may
affect the jurisdiction of a court of this state or the
other necessary expenses of the party so appearing
and of the child if this is just and proper under the I disposition to be made by it in a custody proceeding.
H«
circumstances.
MM J
78-45C-17. Certified copies of decrees furnished
7t-45c-12. rmrUes bound by custody decree •
by derlc of court.
Conducive unless atodifted.
The clerk of a district court of this state, at the
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state I
which had jurisdiction under section 78-45c-3, ] request of the court of another state or at the
request
of any person who is affected by or has a
binds all parties who have been served in this state
or notified in accordance with section 78-45c-5 or I legitimate interest in a custody decree, shall certify
and forward a copy of the decree to that court or
who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court,
person.
Hat
and who have been given an opportunity to be
7I-4SC-1I. Taking testimony of persons in other
heard. As to these parties the custody decree is
states.
conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided
In addition to other procedural devices available
and as to the custody determination made unless
and until that determination is modified pursuant to j to a party, any party to the proceeding or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child
law, including the provisions of this act.
net
I may adduce testimony of witnesses, including parties
7t-45c-l3. atecoguitioa aad eaforceaseat of
I and the child, by deposition or otherwise, in another
foreign decrees.
The courts of this state shall recognize and I state. The court on its own motion may direct that
the testimony of a person be taken in another state
enforce an initial or modification decree of a court
of another state which had assumed jurisdiction I and may prescribe the manner in which and the
I
terms upon which the testimony shall be taken.
HSS
under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this act or which was made under factual I 7f-4$c-19. Request to court of another state to
I
take evidence, to make studies or to order
circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of
I
appearance of party - Payment of costs.
the act. s o long as this decree has not been modified
I
(1) A court of this state may request the appropin accordance with jurisdictional standards substaI riate court of another state to hold a hearing to
ntially siaailar to those of this act.
t«*»
I adduce evidence, to order a party to produce or give
78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree I evidence under other procedures of that state, or to
Pimsjntiites • Factors considered.
I have social studies made with respect to the custody
(1) If a court of another state has made a custody
of a child involved in proceedings pending in the
decree, a court of this state shall not modify that • court of this state; and to forward to the court of
decree — l e u (a) it appears to the court of this state
this state certified copies of the transcript of the
that the court which rendered the decree does not
record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise
now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequadduced, or any social studies prepared in compliisites substantially in accordance with this act or has
ance with the request. The cost of the services may ;
declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree
be assessed against the parties.
and (b> the court of this state has jurisdiction.
(2) A court of this state may request the approp(2) If a court of this state is authorized under '
riate court of another state to order a party to
subsection (1) and section 78-45c-8 to modify a
custody
proceedings pending in the court of this
custody decree of another state it shall give due
state to appear in the proceedings, and if that party
consideration to the transcript of the record and
has physical custody of the child, to appear with the
other documents of all previous proceedings subm[ child. The request may state that travel and other
itted to it in accordance with section 78-45c-22.
necessary expenses of the party and of the chUd >
7t-45c-15. Filing foreign decree - Effect •
"*
whose appearance is desired will be assessed against
Enfnaveaseat - Award of expenses.
another party or will otherwise be paid.
tstt
(1) A certified copy of a custody decree of
7t-45c-M. Taking evidence for use In court of
another state may be filed in the office of the clerk
another state • Ordering appearance In another
of any district court of this state. The clerk shall
state • Enfofceatent - Costs.
treat the decree in the same manner as a custody
(1) Upon request of the court of another state the
decree o f the district court of this state. A custody J courts of this state which are competent to hear decree so filed has the same effect and shall be I custody matters may order a person in this state to
enforced in like manner as a custody decree rend- I appear at a hearing to adduce evidence or to
ered by a court of this state.
J produce or give evidence under other procedures
(2) A person violating a custody decree of another I available in this state. A certified copy of the trsastate which makes it necessary to enforce the decree I script of the record of the hearing or the e v * < *^f
in this state may be required to pay necessary travel
otherwise adduced shall be forwarded by the cterK
and other expenses, including attorney's fees, inc- I of the court to the requesting court.
urred by the party entitled to the custody or his
368

For A n n o U t i o n s , consult

I D E O C O ' S A n n o t a t i o n Service

Judicial Code
(2) A person within this state may voluntarily give
pis testimony or statement in this state for use in a
custody proceeding outside this state.
(3) Upon request of the court of another sUte a
competent court of this state may order a person in
this state to appear alone or with the child in a
custody proceeding in another state. The court may
condition compliance with the request upon assurance by the other state that travel and other necessary expenses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the
person who has physical custody of the child cannot
be served of fails to obey the order, or it appears
the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a
warrant of arrest against such person to secure bis
appearance with the child in the other state.
t«*
7t-45c-21. Preservation of records of proceedings
• Famishing copies to other state courts.
In any custody proceeding in this state the court
shall preserve the pleadings, orders and decrees, any
record that has been made of iu hearings, social
studies, and other pertinent documents until the
child reaches 18 years of age. Upon appropriate
request of the court of another state the court shall
forward to the other court certified copies of any or
all of such documents.
MM
7t-45c-22. Requesting court records from another
state.
If a custody decree has been rendered in another
state concerning a child involved in a custody proceeding pending in a court of this state, the court of
this s u t e upon taking jurisdiction of the case shall
request of the court of the other state a certified
copy of the transcript of any court record and other
documents mentioned in section 78-45c-21.
us*
7t-45c-23. Foreign countries • Application of
general policies.
The general policies of this act extend to the international area. The provisions of this act relating
to the recognition and enforcement of custody
decrees of other states apply to custody decrees and
decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature
to custody rendered by appropriate authorities of
other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity
to be heard were given to all affected persons.
was
7*-45c-24. Priority on court calendar.
Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding which raises a question of existence or exercise
of jurisdiction under this act the case shall be given
calendar priority and handled expeditiously.
MM
7t-45c-25. Notices • Orders to appear Manner of service.
(1) Whenever the terms of this act impose a duty
npon the court to notify a party or court of a particuiar fact or action, such notification may be aceoaplished by the clerk of the court or a party to the
action upon order of the court.
(2) Orders of the court for parties or persons to
•Ppear before the court in accordance with the
' terms of this act shall include legal and sufficient
•trvice of process in accordance with the Utah Rules
•f Civil Procedure unless otherwise ordered for
tood cause shown.
m»
*-4Sc-2d. Short title.
This act may be cited as the "Utah Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act."
tsst

Chapter 45d. Mandatory Income
Withholding for Child Support

7*~45d-l.

71454-2. FroviaJoa for lacoaw a Has I H I U la c M M
rapport oraor.
7S-4S4-3. t^acoaara for •Migce awkiag I K O M
7S-S54-4. Office pnetdmit for I M M wttaaoktta* Nonce to oaagor - Opaortaalty for acartag - A * © * *
- Payawat of oreraae catta soap art a n y aoi a * aafe
7S-454-S.
7S-4S4-*.
7S-454-7.
7S-454-*.

Nonce to payor.
Payor's arocoiar* (or lacoaw wttaaoMlag
Ternuaanoa of lacoaw wtuUMMtagPayor's cowpaaact wtta lacoaw wtlaaoldim

7g-4S4*lt. Priority of aoffcc to wfcaaoM iacoaar.
7 * 4 5 4 - 1 1 . lacoaw wHaaoMiag rtgaralMM of ntUtmtt of
c M M or state la watch order tatcroi • Goveraiac law.
7S-4S4-12. Records . W 4

7*454-13. lacoi

7g-45d-l. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Child" means a son or daughter who is under
the age of 18 years, or who is physically or mentally
handicapped and incapable of earning income sufficient to support himself.
(2) "Child support" means a financial obligation
ordered by a court or administrative body for the
support of a child, including current periodic payments and all arrearages. Child support includes
court ordered obligations for the support of a
spouse or former spouse with whom the child
resides, if the spousal support is collected with the
child support.
(3) "Child support order" means a judgment,
decree, or order of a court or administrative body
whether interlocutory or final, whether or not prospectively or retroactively modifiable, whether incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial or legal
separation, separate maintenance, paterniry, guardianship, civil protection, or otherwise, which:
(a) establishes or modifies child support;
(b) reduces child support arrearages to judg(c) establishes child support or confirms a chfld
support order under Chapter 31, Title 77.
(4) "Delinquent' or "delinquency' means that
child support in an amount at least equal to current
child support payable for one month is overdue.
(5) 'Department* means the Department of Social
Services.
(6") "Income" means earnings or compensation for
personal services whether denominated as wages,
salary, commission, bonus, contract payment, or
otherwise, including gam derived from caxatai
assets, periodic payments made under pension programs, retirement programs, or insurance policies,
and unemployment compensation insurance benefit*
(7) "Jurisdiction" means a state or poitical sabdivision, a territory or possession of the United
States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(«) "Obligor" means a person owing a duty of
child support.
(?) "Obligee" means a person or entity entitled to
receive child support, including an agency of this or
another jurisdiction.
(10) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Ser
vices.
(11) "Payor" means an employer or any persoo
whx>U a source of income to an obligor.
tm
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EXHIBIT "A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN
WEINER (RAWLINGS),
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No.

16868

MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
Defendant.

The plaintiff has filed a motion for change of jurisdiction
to King County in the State of Washington, which motion is denied,
Plaintifffs

since Washington has declined to take jurisdiction.

Motion for dismissal of defendant's Order To Show. Cause will be
denied.

Request for continuance will be granted to the extent that

the December 30th, 1985 hearing will be vacated and set at the furtn
convenience of the court.

Plaintiff's motion for disqualification o

the Judge will be denied, the Judge indicating by his statement and
order that he is not communicating with defendant and Judge Call is
qualified to hear any further action.
DATED:

23 December 1985.
BY THE COURT:

UiMi

VENOY /CHRISTOFF ER6EN-, 5ISTRICT Jl
//

! •

MAILING CERTIFICATE

Copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision mailed this

'JQ-

~#c-

of December 1985, to Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney for Plaintiff, Jam<

-2C. Jenkins & Associates, 67 East 100 North, P. 0. Box 3700, Logan
Utah 84321 and to Mark D. Weiner, Pro Se, 665 South 700 West,
Brigham City, Utah 84302.
Jay R. Hirschi
Box Elder County Clerk

He
Deputy

J A M I 8 RF.C'3
EXHIBIT *'B'

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUN'
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN RAWLINGS,

)

Petitioner, )
NO. 85-3-04844-3
v.
ORDER DECLINING
JURISDICTION

MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
Respondent. )

Petitioner's motion for determination of jurisdiction and
communication with Box Elder County District Court having duly
and regularly come on for hearing, the same being referred to
the undersigned commissioner who had presided over contemporane
ous Juvenile Court proceedings concerning the custody of the
children subject of this proceeding and retained jurisdiction
therein; the court having further communicated with the appropi
ate judge of Bex Elder County District Court; now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this court
finds that the custody and visitation of the children subject 1
this proceeding has also been subject to the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Box Elder County District Court of the Stat
of Utah; that said court acquired jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter several years ago and has continuously,
exercised jurisdiction in enforcement and modification proceedings; and that one of the named parties, father of the childrei
ORDER - 1

A

r

ry. X.'i ^'-'- -

continues to reside in the State of Utah; that upon communication with said court it has elected and determined to continue
exercising sole and exclusive child custody jurisdiction; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (RCW 26.27) it is determined that Box
Elder County District Court of the State of Utah continues to
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and
visitation of the parties1 children, the parties not having
agreed to litigate exclusively in the State of Washington and
there being no emergency justifying intervention in the matter
by Washington Courts; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Washington proceedings concerning the custody of said children are hereby stayed

until

further order of the court or until an appropriate motion for
dismissal proceedings is filed and granted; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the courts of Washington and this
proceeding shall remain open for enforcement provisions of such
orders as have been and may be entered by the Box Elder County
District Court of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of
the UCCJA.

Dated and signed in open this / ^

of January, 1986

Stephen Caddis
STEPHEN M. GADDIS, COURT COMMISSIONER

ORDER - 2

• n .. . ; -i. ' v-* •

. n
P V

St.'ATr'..r" •.VA.S'-iNi'; O N
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January 13, 1985

Venoy Christofferson
District Court Judge
Box Elder County District Court
Box Elder County Courthouse
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Re: Rawlings v. Weiner
King County Cause No. 85-3-04844-3
Dear Judge Christofferson:
Pursuant to my communication with your court in December, 1985, I
have drafted and entered the original of the enclosed order. At
this time I do not know what further steps will be requested of
the Washington court, but yould appreciate your forwarding to the
clerk of our court copies further substantive orders or decrees
as may be entered in Utah respecting this family.

SMG/jl

cc: Mark Weiner
Ralph Thompson, Jr.
Lynn Pollock

r ,-\ !M *;• r. I C Q -

OCT 2 3 11
Stephen W. Jewell 3814
Attorney for Plaintiff
First Security Bldg., Third Floor
15 South Main
Logan, Utah 84321
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN
RAWLINGS,

*
*

ORDER ON ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
*

vs.

Civil No. 16868

MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
*

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on May 21, 22, and 26, 1986, the Honorable Omer J. Call
presiding.

The Plaintiff appeared personally and by and

through her attorney, Stephen W. Jewell.
appeared personally.

The Defendant

The Court having heard sworn testimony

and evidence and having reviewed the pleadings on file herein
and the Exhibits presented, including the information from the
Washington Shelter Care proceedings, and having heard the
arguments of Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant, and having
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the
following:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

RAWLINGS OTSC

1.

Plaintiff shall be and is hereby held in contempt of

Court for failing to comply with the previous order of the
Court to discontinue the use of the Rawlings name for the
children.
2.

The name of the children is Weiner and there shall

be no use by the Plaintiff of the Rawlings' name as the last
name of the children, either, for scjiool records, .medical , /J ,

r+^

records, or otherwise. j^^UiL^,

W ^ >

3.

yv^te-rttd* ^c rH^<-* riU ,w-*^ LC>4U~*^

The reports of Dx-w4nDjLptX^ljunjyAU-'!|!*?^ Dr. Jack

cgr
\J*^bs

Reiter shall be presented to all current mental health care
providers for their review and consideration.
4.

Counseling and therapy as ordered by this Court and

by tne Washington Court shall be resumed with Dr. Marilyn
Esneiman or such otner qualified mental health care provider
as determined by Plaintiff and therapy shall be continued with
Dr. Tom Fairbank for Defendant.

The Court specifically orders

that once said mental health care provider is selected by
Plaintiff, there shall be no change of therapists without an
order of the Court.

Therapy will continue until terminated by

the Court on the recommendation of the therapists.

Should the

therapist become unavailable or desire to terminate the
relationship, Plaintiff shall immediately thereafter petition
the Court for removal thereof and appointment of another
mental health therapist.

2

J

5.

All mail sent by Defendant or Plaintiff to the

children shall be received by Plaintiff or Defendant and
delivered/\to the children, whether said mail is sent first
class or registered.
6.

Each party shall provide the other party and the

Court with a current and regularly updated home phone number
and address.

During visitation, Defendant shall reasonably

inform Plaintiff of the whereabouts of the children and shall
provide an address and telephone number where the children can
be reached.
7.

There shall be no monitoring of telephone calls or

other recording of conversations or video taping
8.

*/£lu^«'*

It is the order of the Court that telephone

conversations need be no longer than ten (10) to twenty (20)
minutes long,
9.

J

Legal custody of the minor children of the parties

shall be jointly vested in each of the parties, with Plaintiff
being granted primary physical custody of the children with
visitation to Defendant as herein provided.
10.

Defendant shall be granted visitation with the

children as follows, recognizing that visitation is for the
chidren, and their needs are of primary importance in
determining visitation arrangements:
A.

During the children's school summer vacation.
Defendant shall be entitled to six (6) continuous

iU^
weeks. For 1986 said visitation shall begin.on
June 22 for six <6) weeksM' on June 29 for six
(6) weeks/Non July 6 for six (6) weeks, or on
July 13 for six (6) weeks at the discretion of
Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall notify the Defendant
June 1, 1986, by registered mail, when said
visitation shall begin, and on each year
thereafter on or before June 1. Said
visitation to be scheduled in future years
shall substantially comply with the order
as as stated above. Saidjsixj 6) weeks
visitation shall begin vim may ynt 5:00 p.m.,
and continue for six (6) weeks to the sixth
SpES^t at 5:00 p.m.

^

During said six <6) week visitation, Plaintiff
shall be granted at least weekly telephone
conversations with each of the children and
shall be allowed visitation for at least two
(2) weekends, beginning Friday at 5:00 p.m.,
to Sunday at 5:00 p.m. Plaintiff shall notify
Defendant of the visitation schedule on or
before June 1, 1986, and subsequent years, by
registered mail. Said visitation may be
exercised by Plaintiff
i, and the children
*rj v»*~
shall be picked up and returned to St&&mmm tU v#*"i
^SEfey*- with no other restrictions except as
stated herein.
Defendant shall be allowed further visitation
of four to five <4 to 5) days during the
children's school Easter vacation in the
spring and three to four <3 to 4) days during
October or November as is allowed by the
children's school vacation as scheduled, not
to include Thanksgiving. Plaintiff shall notify
Defendant of the dates and times such visitation
shall take place by registered mail at least
sixty (60) days prior to said visitation, or
when the school schedule is available. Said
visitation shall in no way interfere with
regularly scheduled school.
Thanksgiving and Christmas visitation shall
continue as provided in previous orders of the

Court.

4

11.

Travel expenses for all visitation, including

picking up the children in Washington and returning them to
Washington for the summer visitation, shall be the
responsibility of Defendant.

Defendant shall be entitled to

deduct from child support payments a total of $300.00 per year
for all visitation and travel expenses.

If Plaintiff delivers

the children to Brigham City and picks up the children from
Brigham City for any visitation. Defendant shall be entitled
to deduct only $200.00 for total travel expenses rather than
$300.00.

Defendant shall continue to be allowed to reduce

child support obligations by $400.00 during summer visitation.
12.

There shall be no other changes in child support

paid by Defendant except as ordered for travel expenses.
13.

All repeated conflict and emotional distress and

strain shall be discontinued by the parties.
14.

No police officers or other individuals shall

intervene or otherwise be used to force compliance with this
order.

Washington Social Services or such other qualified

agency shall be allowed to assist in compelling compliance of
the Court order if deemed reasonably necessary by such agency
after a proper review.

The Court will allow reasonable

exclusions from visitation for illness if any such child is
isolated because of said illness or upon a doctor's
certification.
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15.
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